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Abstract
I consider exactly what is involved in a solution to the probability
problem of the Everett interpretation, in the light of recent work on ap-
plying considerations from decision theory to that problem. I suggest
an overall framework for understanding probability in a physical theory,
and conclude that this framework, when applied to the Everett interpre-
tation, yields the result that that interpretation satisfactorily solves the
measurement problem.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen substantial progress on both of the main problems tra-
ditionally associated with the Everett (“many-worlds”) interpretation.
The first of these, the ‘preferred basis problem’, is not my concern here;
suffice it to say that I believe considerations from decoherence theory, together
with the right philosophical analysis of higher-order ontology, appears sufficient
to resolve it. (I expand somewhat on these remarks in section 3.2; for a more
detailed analysis see Wallace (2003a).) My concern is with the second, the
‘probability problem’, where again a combination of technical and conceptual
results have transformed a problem which appeared intractable.
The probability problem can usefully be divided into two parts:
The incoherence problem: In a deterministic theory where in theory we
might have perfect knowledge, how can it even make sense to assign prob-
abilities to outcomes?
The quantitative problem: Even if it does make sense to assign probabilities
to outcomes, why should they be the probabilities given by the Born rule?
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Until fairly recently, both problems seemed intractable: any attempt to resolve
either, at least without modifying the basic structure of quantum mechanics
seemed doomed to failure. But recent work by Deutsch (1999), Saunders (1998),
Vaidman (2002), Greaves (2004), myself (Wallace 2003b,Wallace 2003c,Wallace
2005,Wallace 2006b) and others has made use of considerations from decision
theory, personal identity, philosophy of probability, and philosophy of language
to provide both conceptual frameworks for thinking about probability in the
Everettian context, and — perhaps more surprisingly — concrete mathematical
results which purport to be (Everett-interpretation-specific) derivations of the
Born rule.
Intractability has a certain simplicity. By contrast, our current state of
knowledge about the probability problem has become quite complex and con-
troversial; it is unclear exactly how to frame the problem which we are trying
to solve, and correspondingly unclear what would count as a solution.
This paper is an attempt to untangle the situation: in it I have tried to
lay down exactly what I believe is involved in a solution to the measurement
problem, and to show what needs to be done for the Everett interpretation to
be understood to provide such a solution.
Section 2 is concerned with probabilistic theories in general and not with
quantum mechanics (let alone the Everett interpretation) in particular; in this
section I advocate what I call ‘cautious functionalism’ as the correct attitude to
take to probability in physical theories.
In the remainder of the paper, I apply this framework to quantum mechan-
ics and the Everett interpretation. Section 3 lays out my preferred approach to
the Everett interpretation: in sections 3.1–3.2 I set out a framework for what
is required of a solution to the measurement problem and how that framework
applies to the Everett interpretation (in particular, how it requires that we un-
derstand quantum branching events as genuinely uncertain in some sense). Sec-
tions 3.3–3.5 analyse how uncertainty can be understood to exist in a branching
universe, and section 3.6 considers how (given an understanding of uncertainty)
quantitative probability can also be understood in a branching universe — un-
derstood better, in fact, than in a non-branching universe!
In section 4 I consider an alternative approach: the ‘fission program’, in
which we make no essential use of the concept of uncertainty or subjective
probability in considering branching. Although I conclude that the fission pro-
gram is ultimately not a viable approach to the Everett interpretation, it does
lead to some important insights which become relevant in section 5, in which I
consider whether the decision-theoretic principles which are part and parcel of
the ‘uncertainty’ concept are really justified in a branching universe. Section 6
is the conclusion.
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2 What is probability?
2.1 Objective probability and the principal principle
It is fairly widely accepted that there are (at least) two distinct notions of
‘probability’.
Firstly, there is subjective probability, or ‘credence’: that is, probability
taken as a measure of an agent’s degree of belief in a hypothesis. Here, prob-
ability is taken as a numerical quantification of the notions of ‘likelihood’ and
‘uncertainty’, which arguably we already understand in qualitative terms.
Foundationally speaking, credence is in fairly good shape. If asked to justify
its use, our first response is to appeal to so-called ‘Dutch Book’ arguments to
show that any other method of quantifying our beliefs forces us to lose money.
On careful analysis these are not really convincing, but they have far more con-
vincing relatives in decision theory. Decision theory (in the forms developed
by Savage (1972) and Jeffrey (1983)) begins with a purely qualitative notion of
an agent’s preferences over various courses of action, and allows us to prove a
representation theorem to the effect that that agent must quantify his uncer-
tainty in terms of probability or violate some intuitively reasonable principle of
rationality. (For a brief but careful defence of this approach to credence, see the
first chapter of Kaplan (1996); for more details, see Joyce (1999)).
But if credence is well defined, it is nonetheless too thin a notion to play the
role of objective probability (OP), the robust, observer-independent property
which we use in much of science and in particular in quantum mechanics. We
have, I believe, no truly satisfactory analysis of what sort of entity or property
this ‘objective probability’ really is.
We do, however, have a good theory of how OP fits into our general con-
ceptual scheme: it does so via Lewis’s Principal Principle (Lewis 1980). Recall
that the Principal Principle states, roughly, that if I know the objective proba-
bility of an event E to be p, then I am rationally compelled to set my personal
credence in E to be p. More precisely, it states that if Xp is the proposition that
OP (E) = p, and A is any ‘admissible’1 proposition compatible with X, then
Cr(E|A&Xp) = p. (1)
(Lewis uses ‘chance’ as his term for OP, and regards it as necessarily in-
volving indeterminism: classical statistical mechanics, and Bohmian mechanics,
aren’t chancy in his sense. I shall use the term more broadly: the probabilities
of statistical mechanics seem as robust and as observer-independent (and as
mysterious!) as those of stochastic theories, and (provided that ‘inadmissible
propositions’ is extended to cover microphysical knowledge such as the actual
microstate of the system or the actual location of the Bohmian corpuscle) the
Principal Principle applies just as well for them. There is no particular ety-
mological reason to restrict ‘chance’ to chances in Lewis’s sense, but to avoid
1Inadmissible propositions are not formally defined by Lewis, but essentially the qualifier
is there to rule out propositions which are directly about the future — e. g. , prophecies or the
testimony of time travellers.
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confusion I use the more neutral, albeit more cumbersome, ‘objective probabil-
ity’ to cover the more general class of physics-defined probabilities.)
Other than that it satisfies the Principal Principle, what do we actually know
about OP? Answer: essentially nothing. Mathematically, it enters through ei-
ther a measure on the set of initial conditions or a stochastic differential equation
— that is, in effect, through a measure on either the initial conditions or on the
dynamically possible histories. But the interpretation of that measure remains
obscure. There are proposals — such as frequentism, or Lewis’s Best-Systems
analysis — that try to define that measure in terms of facts about the actual
world, but it is at best extremely controversial both whether these proposals
allow us to define an appropriate measure at all, and whether it could be shown
to constrain a rational agent’s credences.
This being the case, we may as well take the Principal Principle as offering
a functional definition of OP. That is, if some physical theory T enables us to
define some magnitude C for events, then C is OP just if anyone believing T is
compelled to constrain his credences to equal C. More formally, C is OP iff for
any event E, if T together with (admissible) background information B entails
that C(E) = p, then
Cr(E|B&T ) = p. (2)
This ‘functional definition’ allows us to sidestep — temporarily — the ques-
tion of what chance is when we consider its role in science. For suppose we do
have a theory T which allows us to define some magnitude C, and suppose PPC
is the proposition that C satisfies the functional definition (we might loosely
say: satisfies the Principal Principle — hence the notation). It follows that if
we accept both T and PPC , we should set our credence in an event E equal to
C(E). If C(E) is high and our prior credence in E is much less high, we should
regard (T&PPC) as explanatory of E, and thus regard E as reason to accept T
and PPC .
This argument can be rephrased in Bayesian terms:
Cr(T&PPC |E) = Cr(E|T&PPC)Cr(T&PPC)
Cr(E)
; (3)
hence
Cr(T&PPC |E)
Cr(T&PPC)
=
C(E)
Cr(E)
. (4)
Since to accept both T and PPC is to accept the existence of objective prob-
ability, it follows that we can gain evidence — even very powerful evidence —
for objective probability functionally defined, without ever knowing what sort
of thing that ‘objective probability’ really is.
2.2 Three ways of satisfying the functional definition
Nonetheless, we’d still like to know what it is. What is the “magnitude C” de-
fined by the theory T? There are essentially three options. The first, which
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might be called functionalism,2 asserts that probability is some physically-
definable property (or set of physically-definable properties) which can be de-
fined independently of the Principal Principle but which can be shown to satisfy
the functional definition which the Principle provides.
According to functionalism, PPC must somehow be a logical consequence of
T (more precisely: of T together with general principles of rationality and pos-
sibly other background assumptions). For instance, a frequentist (put crudely)
identifies probability with long-run relative frequency; he is correct iff it can
be proved that a rational agent knowing the long-run relative frequency of a
particular outcome of a repeated experiment would set his credence in getting
that particular outcome on a single run equal to the long-run relative frequency.
The problem with frequentist versions of functionalism is that we have very
little idea how to prove that long-run frequency can be proved to satisfy the
functional definition of probability; the problem with functionalism more gener-
ally is that we have very little idea how to prove that anything can be proved to
satisfy that definition. The problem is not so much that we don’t know how to
define something with the formal properties of probability (relative frequencies
do okay here; Lewis’s ‘best-systems analysis’ (Lewis 1997) does better); rather,
it is that we do not have any really plausible account of why that something
should place any constraints on my credences. Why should I, betting in the
here and now on whether this atom is going to decay, care at all about how
many similar atoms in remote regions of the Universe have decayed?
The apparent impossibility of finding a naturalistic candidate for probability
provides much of the attraction for the second option, primitivism. Primitivists
accept the functional definition as a basic law of nature: not something to
be deduced as holding for an independently characterisable property C, but
something which is postulated to be true of C and which defines C via its role
in the law.
The strategy is not unfamiliar. Take charge, for example: it is highly plausi-
ble to suppose that the property of having charge q cannot be defined or made
sense of other than via the role of charge in the laws of electromagnetism (see
Lewis (1970) for a full working-out of this strategy3). Furthermore, it seems to
fit well with the mathematical structure of our existing probabilistic theories: as
was alluded to above, both in stochastic theories like GRW and in deterministic
theories with an unknown microstate, objective probability eventually enters as
a measure on the space of physically possible histories, which has no role in the
theory except to be probability: that is, to satisfy the functional definition.
Nonetheless, primitivism is a desperate strategy. Do we really want to take a
rationality principle as a basic postulate of nature, on a par with the dynamical
laws of spacetime and field theories? Are we prepared to accept that it is
logically possible that every physical property of the universe could remain the
2Functionalism is close to the position espoused by Lewis (1986, xiv-xvi), who requires
that probabilities be shown to be ‘Humean properties’.
3See Shoemaker (1980) and (Mellor 1991) for further defences of this ‘functional’ definition
of properties; note also that Lewis seems later (Lewis 1983) to have moved to a different
position.
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same in some alternate possible world, and yet that what is rational could
change?
The third strategy — eliminativism — is in turn motivated by the grave
conceptual problems of the other two strategies. It is the doctrine that objective
probability does not exist: that it is unsurprising that we cannot work out what
fits the functional definition of probability, for nothing does.
If primitivism is desperate, eliminativism is all but unacceptable. The ubiq-
uity of the concept of objective probability throughout science, and indeed in
ordinary life (think of the roulette wheel and the fair coin) makes it intolerable
not to accept that something fits the functional definition given by the Principal
Principle. (Or so it seems to me; but others disagree. How they can maintain
with a straight face that the half-life of uranium is not an objective property
of the world is beyond me, but I shall not attempt to defend the point further
here.)
2.3 Cautious functionalism
Philosophers’ Syndrome: mistaking a failure of imagination for an
insight into necessity (Dennett 1991a, p. 410)
Faced with this dispiriting trilemma, what attitude should we take towards
probability statements in our physical theories? I suggest a cautious function-
alism. Unlike the other two strategies, the only philosophical problem with
functionalism is our total inability to think of anything that might fit the func-
tional definition . . . but our imagination has failed before.
Cautious functionalism, faced with a theory T that defines some property
C which seems to play the role of probability, proceeds as follows. It collects
evidence, as above, for the joint hypothesis (T&PPC), all the while acknowl-
edging that T comes with an attached promissory note: eventually we will need
an account both of how C is to be defined independently of the Principal Prin-
ciple and of how, given this independent characterisation of C, PPC can be
derived. Until the note is cashed, the theory has a certain phenomenological,
non-fundamental character, yet for all that it may be highly explanatory. And
if the note is never cashed, perhaps eventually we would be wise to become
pessimistic and reconsider primitivism or (just possibly) eliminativism.4
4It may seem somewhat strange that PPC , which according to functionalism must in
principle be derivable a priori, is nonetheless the sort of thing for which we can collect evidence.
But there is nothing strange about having a posteriori evidence for a priori truths. (How
many of us have actually worked through the proof of Fermat’s last theorem, rather than
trusting the word of others that it is provable?) There is not even anything particularly
strange about gaining a posteriori evidence for a normative principle. For example, consider
the Monty Hall problem: a game-show featuring three doors, with goats behind two of them
and a car behind the third; you choose one door, and without revealing what is behind it the
host opens one of the other doors to reveal a goat. Two doors remain; if offered the chance
to open your original choice or the other one, should you swap? Yes, in fact; but remarkably
many people both get the problem wrong and resolutely refuse to believe that they have got
it wrong. Such a person might watch many reruns of the game show, and conclude that in
fact he should swap, and yet be at a loss to understand why he should swap.
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Cautious functionalism is not actually (I hope!) that contentious a posi-
tion. Primitivism and eliminativism are not views that one would adopt despite
having a perfectly satisfactory functionalist candidate for objective probability;
they are views that one adopts in response to the belief that nothing could be
such a candidate. (For instance, objections to frequentist definitions of proba-
bility are made on the grounds that they don’t work (that is, in my framework,
that they don’t fit the functional definition) — not that even if they did work
they would be unsustainable.) So a primitivist, or an eliminativist, can be seen
as a cautious functionalist who has already reached the point of pessimism and
given up on any successful functionalist analysis. Either, I hope, would will-
ingly recant their pessimism if shown that a functionalist analysis was after all
possible.
2.4 Is the functional definition complete?
Before turning from probability in general to the specific case of quantum me-
chanics, I must address one possible worry: can we really be sure, in using the
Principal Principle to produce our ‘functional definition of probability’, that
we have not left out a crucial feature of objective probability? Maybe there
is some additional feature F of probability, such that something satisfying the
functional definition but not possessing F would not be objective probability.
As a matter of semantics, this may well be defensible — our ordinary ‘prob-
ability’ talk is inchoate and ambiguous between objective probability and cre-
dence, and maybe it does have additional features and complications. But if
we are discussing the scientific conception of objective probability — that is, the
theoretical term which we have introduced to explain experimental situations
which seem to need probability — then I am not sure what evidence we could
have for F .
To see this, let us temporarily introduce “quasiprobability” as a term for
anything satisfying the functional definition given by the Principal Principle
and discussed above. It is, I take it, uncontentious that probability (whatever
it is) satisfies the definition5, so probability is a certain sort of quasiprobability
— one possessing the additional feature F which was left out of the functional
definition. Suppose we have a collection of experimental data which is explained
well by some theory T involving ‘genuine’ probability. That is, T assigns high
probability to the relative frequencies which we in fact observe. Suppose also
that we have some other theory T ′ which involves only ‘quasiprobability’ but
which assigns high quasiprobability to the observed relative frequencies — in
fact, which assigns quasiprobabilities exactly equal to the ‘real’ probabilities
assigned by T .
In such a situation the extra property F appears quite redundant. The evi-
dential process by which we continue to test T and T ′ connects (quasi-)probability
to our observations entirely through the Principal Principle, which applies to
5For an argument to this effect, see Lewis’s “questionnaire” (Lewis 1980); similar arguments
have been advanced by, e. g. , Mellor (1971).
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quasi-probability whether or not it has the property F . And the same will
apply when we come to use the theory in practical applications — to go from
(quasi-)probabilities to actions, we must go via the Principal Principle.
The only use that I can see for F is that it might be a necessary part of why
probability satisfies the functional definition. If, for instance, relative frequen-
cies were in fact the only possible candidate for a realiser of the functionalist
definition of probability, then something with the formal properties of probabil-
ity which is not a relative frequency could not be true probability.
But this is only to say that our initial guess that a particular quantity is
a quasi-probability could be wrong. If it is wrong, if that quantity does not
satisfy the functional definition, then it is no quasi-probability at all. And if
some quasi-probability could be shown to satisfy the functional definition (as, I
shall argue, occurs in the Everett interpretation) whilst lacking F , then it would
be a demonstration that F was not after all necessary.
If there are requirements for probability over and above the functional defi-
nition, I conclude that it is obscure at best what they could be. For the rest of
this paper, then, I shall assume that quasi-probability is a redundant concept.
Anything which genuinely does satisfy the functional definition is probability.
3 The Everett interpretation and subjective un-
certainty
3.1 Interpreting quantum mechanics
I have suggested a general framework for the understanding of theories which
incorporate objective probability. But what of quantum mechanics? There the
theory seems to speak of objective probability, but there also the theory seems
ill-defined without an ‘interpretation’.
As an interpretation-neutral approach to this question,6 I suggest the fol-
lowing: what we currently possess is a theory fragment. To be more precise:
quantum mechanics can be understood as giving a description of certain (usu-
ally microscopic) systems. But the connection between that description and our
observations proceeds not via a continuation of the theory but via an algorithm:
when a state comes to describe a superposition of macroscopically-definite out-
comes, reinterpret the mod-squared-amplitudes of each outcome as giving the
objective probability of that outcome’s obtaining.
Regarded this way, this ‘theory fragment’ (which we might call the Quan-
tum Algorithm) is deficient in two ways, the second by far worse than the first.
Firstly, in admitting objective probabilities without providing a theory of same,
it lacks a truly acceptable account of probability. However, as the previous sec-
tion argues, it shares this defect with all other probabilistic theories, so perhaps
calling it a ‘defect’ at all is unfair.
6I develop this approach to the Measurement Problem in rather more detail in Wallace
(2006a).
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Secondly, and more pressingly, it is not really a theory capable of describing
reality in an observer-independent way. Rather, the ‘reinterpretation’ of the
quantum state which occurs when it becomes macroscopic has no real explana-
tion attached to it beyond its empirical success. That is: the theory fragment
gives no principled answer to the question of why the reinterpretation should
be made; the only justification is that it seems to make correct predictions.
What is the goal of an ‘interpretation’ of quantum mechanics? I claim that
it is to embed the Quantum Algorithm into a genuine theory, one which does
not resort to pragmatic considerations and ‘reinterpretation’ of its basic ontol-
ogy. This embedding can be exact (as the Everett interpretation claims to be)
or approximate (as in dynamical-collapse theories), and it may add additional
structure (as in hidden-variable theories), but in any case it must be sufficiently
accurate that it can reproduce the powerful empirical success of the Quantum
Algorithm.7
So: our interpretation must resolve the ambiguity and ill-definedness inherit
in the move from micro to macro. Must it also offer a physical property that
satisfies the Principal Principle? It depends on how strict our criteria are for
an acceptable physical theory. The previous section, in advocating ‘cautious
functionalism’, argued that eventually we must move from treating the Principal
Principle as a primitive rule and begin to treat it as a derived result, but no
probabilistic theory so far proposed has met that stringent test. For the reasons
given in sections 2.1–2.4, I would maintain that inter alia, an interpretation
could take the Principal Principle as primitive for whatever physical properties
it likes, and yet be in as secure a position as any other probabilistic theory which
physicists treat seriously.
3.2 The need for subjective uncertainty
What of the Everett interpretation? It aims to embed the Quantum Algorithm
(that is, instrumentalist quantum mechanics) into a full theory in the most naive
possible way: that is, by extending the formalism which we use for microscopic
systems to cover all systems, be they microscopic, macroscopic or cosmological.
To do so, it must interpret the macroscopic superpositions that result post-
measurement as describing a superposition of different ‘worlds’: different quasi-
classical realities represented by different terms in the wave-function, with some
worlds corresponding to each possible outcome of the experiment.
What justifies this interpretation? After all, a superposition of (for instance)
a live and a dead cat is normally understood as a cat in an indeterminate state
of aliveness, rather than as two cats (one alive, one dead). Early attempts to
solve this preferred basis problem did so by adding explicit extra structure to
7I ignore here the possibility that the Quantum Algorithm itself is misunderstood by in-
terpreting it as speaking of objective probability. Defenders of this position (see, e. g. , Caves,
Fuchs, and Schack 2002; Fuchs and Peres 2000; Fuchs 2002) wish to regard the quantum state
as some sort of credence function rather than something which is in any sense objective. This
would lead to a theory of probability of the sort which I earlier called ‘eliminativist’ and which
I criticised for taking science insufficiently seriously; I shall not discuss it further here.
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the formalism, associating a determinate ensemble of worlds (or, in some for-
mulations, e. g. Lockwood (1996) of minds) with the single quantum state. Such
proposals have not been widely accepted, for two reasons. Firstly, if the formal-
ism is thus modified, it is unclear why one might not regard that ensemble not
as a literal ensemble of isolated worlds (or minds) but as a probability distribu-
tion expressing our ignorance as to which single one of those worlds (or minds)
is actual. That is: it is unclear why such a many-worlds theory should not just
be reinterpreted as a hidden-variable theory, given the considerable ontological
saving. And secondly, much of the attraction of the Everett interpretation is
that it is a pure interpretation (Wallace 2006a) — that is, it adds no additional
formalism to the Schro¨dinger equation.
A more promising way of solving the preferred basis problem has been devel-
oped primarily in the physics community by Zurek, Gell-Mann and Hartle, Zeh
and others, and explored from a philosophical perspective by Saunders and my-
self (see Wallace (2003a, 2006a) and references therein). This approach makes
essential appeal to the physical process of decoherence: it is a mathematical fact
about the Schro¨dinger equation that it contains structures which behave dynam-
ically essentially as classical worlds, and which are causally almost (though not
quite) completely isolated from one another. Given a functionalist approach to
higher-level ontology (as developed by, e. g. , Dennett (1991b) and Ross et al
(2006)), the fact that these terms in the wavefunction are structurally isomor-
phic to dynamically isolated classical worlds makes them legitimate candidates
to be dynamically isolated classical worlds. In this manner, the “many worlds”
can be seen not as being added explicitly to the formalism but as emergent from
it, and questions such as “when do the worlds split” and “which term in the
superposition actually corresponds to a given world” have very precise but not
completely precise answers. (An analogy: Everett worlds are not like Lewis’s
possible worlds: causally completely isolated, ontologically fundamental enti-
ties. They are more like planets: entities emergent from the formalism, whose
inhabitants interact very strongly with one another and hardly at all with in-
habitants of other planets, and whose boundaries are very accurately but not
perfectly defined.)
In any case, it is not the task of this paper to consider in more details how
this many-worlds description of macroscopic superposition may be justified. But
even if it can be done, there remains a seemingly insurmountable problem: how
can the Quantum Algorithm, which involves objective chance, be incorporated
into a deterministic theory in which an agent could in principle have perfect
information about all of the salient features of the quantum state?
To elaborate: the Quantum Algorithm assigns objective chances to the pos-
sible outcomes of quantum-mechanical experiments, and the defining feature of
an objective chance is that rational agents are compelled to set their credences
equal to it (if they know it). Thus, the Quantum Algorithm assumes that agents
have credences in the different outcomes, which in turn are to be understood as
quantitative measures of how certain or uncertain they are about the result of
the experiment.
But if the Everett interpretation is true, what is there to be uncertain about?
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The interpretation makes a deterministic prediction about the post-experiment
state: namely, that it consists of many effectively isolated worlds, with different
measurement outcomes occurring in different worlds. How can we make sense
of being uncertain of the outcome of an experiment in a deterministic theory
where we have perfect knowledge?
I have elsewhere (Wallace 2003c) called this the problem of subjective un-
certainty. (The ‘subjective’ should not be taken too literally: the problem is
to understand why uncertainty statements can rationally be made by agents
embedded in the Everett universe despite their total knowledge of the relevant
facts, but these statements could be ‘there might be a sea-battle tomorrow’ just
as readily as ‘I don’t know what result I will see’.)
3.3 Saunders’ argument for subjective uncertainty
The idea of subjective uncertainty (though not the name) was originally pro-
posed by Saunders (1998), who argues for the SU viewpoint by means of an
ingenious intuition pump.8 His argument proceeds by analogy with “classical
splitting”, such as that which would result from a Star Trek matter transporter
or an operation in which my brain is split in two. It may be summarised as
follows: in ordinary, non-branching situations, the fact that I expect to become
my future self supervenes on the fact that my future self has the right causal and
structural relations to my current self so as to count as my future self. What,
then, should I expect when I have two or more such future selves? There are
only three possibilities:
1. I should expect abnormality: some experience which is unlike normal hu-
man experience (for instance, I might expect somehow to become both
future selves).
2. I should expect to become one or the other future self.
3. I should expect nothing: that is, oblivion.
Of these, (3) seems absurd: the existence of either future self would guarantee
my future existence, so how can the existence of more such selves be treated
as death? (1) is at least coherent — we could imagine some telepathic link
between the two selves. However, on any remotely materialist account of the
mind this link will have to supervene on some physical interaction between the
two copies — an interaction which is not in fact present. This leaves (2) as the
only option, and in the absence of some strong criterion as to which copy to
regard as “really” me, I will have to treat the question of which future self I
become as (subjectively) indeterministic.
8I should note, in criticising Saunders, that his thought experiment was intended primarily
to argue against the claim that quantum branching is metaphysically incoherent, and only
secondarily to defend subjective uncertainty. I have no quarrel with Saunders’ primary goal;
he has conclusively established that the ‘metaphysical incoherence’ argument is indefensible,
given that analogous situations could perfectly well occur in classical physics, and I discuss
the matter no further here.
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(In understanding Saunders’ argument, it is important to realise that there
are no further physical facts to discover about expectations which could decide
between (1-3): on the contrary, ex hypothesi all the physical facts are known.
Rather, we are regarding expectation as a higher-level concept supervenient
on the physical facts — closely related to our intuitive idea of the passage of
time — and asking how that concept applies to a novel but physically possible
situation.)
Of course (argues Saunders) there is nothing particularly important about
the fact that the splitting is classical; hence the argument extends mutatis mu-
tandis to quantum branching, and implies that agents should treat their own
branching as a subjectively indeterministic event.
3.4 Objections to Saunders’ argument
In responding to Saunders, Greaves (2004) argues as follows:
What (to address Saunders’ question) should [someone about to be
duplicated] expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: what-
ever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to
see. So she should (with certainty) expect to see [herself as the first
duplicate], and she should (with certainty) expect to see [herself as
the second duplicate]. Not that she should expect to see both: she
should expect to see each. (Greaves (2004, p. 19); quotation modified
to remove subscripts on pronouns, which will play no role here.)
As Greaves freely admits, Saunders is unwilling to accept this extra possibility,
on the grounds that it is just conceptually impossible to expect two incompatible
possibilities. She responds by claiming that it is conceptually impossible to feel
uncertain about something when one knows all the facts about it.
I think that this impasse can be clarified (if not resolved) by interpreting
Greaves as raising the possibility of concept failure: a breakdown of our con-
cept of personal identity (Saunders, of course, has implicitly assumed that this
concept remains applicable in cases of splitting and seeks, via his possibilities
(1)–(3), to ask how exactly it is applicable.).
Many of Parfit’s examples (in Parfit 1984, pp.199–306) are designed to sug-
gest the possibility of concept failure: Parfit’s intention in doing so is to persuade
the reader to give up on personal identity as something worth caring about and
to replace it with a notion of personal survival (according to which it is perfectly
coherent for me to care about my future successors without having any partic-
ular view about whether they are me or not). I think that Greaves is best read
as sharing this view: according to her version of the Everett interpretation, I
should replace any notion of becoming a post-splitting version of myself simply
with the notion of caring about the future versions of myself, and should treat
‘I expect experience X’ simply as synonymous with ‘a future version of myself
has experience X’.
(This is not exactly how Greaves describes her own attitude to splitting:
she states that identity simply is survival, and so wishes to claim that in cases
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of splitting, I become each of my future selves. However, she does not make
any particular effort to justify this claim other than by extension from the non-
splitting case, and I think that her claim is most appropriately read simply as
holding by definition: to Greaves (as to Parfit) survival is what matters in all
identity cases, so we might as well just use “identity” to refer to survival. Since
Saunders is using the term in a very different sense, to avoid confusion I shall
eschew Greaves’ terminology, and simply refer to ‘survival’ in Parfit’s manner.)
Concept failure is not, I think, something which Saunders can just reject a
priori in the context of his thought experiment. If personal identity is an emer-
gent concept then there is no reason why that concept should not simply break
down in certain situations — especially new and alien ones, such as classical
Parfittian splitting. In fact, another of Parfit’s thought experiments seems to
make it even more obvious that concept failure is a live option: consider a ma-
chine which merges me with Greta Garbo (Parfit 1984, pp. 229–244). Adapting
the example slightly, the machine has a dial with settings from 0 to 100. Set to
0, it leaves me alone; set to 100 it obliterates me and creates Garbo ex nihilo;
set to intermediate values it creates someone with some of my, and some of her,
properties, in a ratio determined by the dial settings. I think it is hard to argue
that, for settings in the vicinity of 50, there is any coherent concept of personal
identity here, or any reasonable answer to the question ‘what do you expect to
happen?’.
However, once concept failure has been admitted as a conceptual possibility,
it is unclear that there need be a ‘correct’ answer to the Saunders thought
experiment. There are in fact no Parfittian splitters on Earth, so our existing
concept is at best underdetermined as regards splitting, and we are actually left
with the question of how (and if) it should be extended.
In fact, there is an extension of it available which answers Greaves’ worries
about the lack of uncertainty in a deterministic universe: that offered by Lewis
(1976), who identifies a person (roughly) as a maximal totally ordered set of
person-stages (with the ordering in question being the partial order: ‘is a de-
scendant of’). According to Lewis’s proposal, if at some stage in my future I am
to undergo branching into two copies, then (timelessly) there are two people,
and my current (pre-branching) person-stages are shared by both of them.
On the additional assumption that the correct referent of utterances and of
mental states is a person at a time (rather than a person-stage) it follows that I
am genuinely ignorant of my post-branching future. For when I say ‘who will I
become’ that statement should actually be ascribed to two versions of me (one of
whom will, post-splitting, become each version of me). Since (as a consequence
of any physicalist approach to the mind) any thoughts and beliefs I have at a
time supervene on my person-stage at that time, and since the two versions of
me share all person-stages prior to branching, it follows that it is impossible for
the two versions of me to resolve their ignorance.
What are they ignorant about? Not of course any propositional knowl-
edge, but something more indexical: something like a centred possible world
(Quine 1969; Lewis 1979), but where the ‘centre’ is a world-line and not a
point. However, presumably Greaves accepts that indexical ignorance is igno-
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rance nonetheless, so the Lewis proposal does seem to offer an extension of our
existing personal-identity concept that survives splitting.
However, just because we can extend our concepts in this way, it doesn’t
seem to be the case that we have to do so. In fact, I think this is a genuine
choice, and one which would likely be made on sociological grounds as much as
philosophical grounds.
To see this, consider another example where personal identity is in doubt:
the simple (non-splitting) teletransporter, where I am disintegrated and a copy
of me is assembled somewhere else from the information scanned from me in
the disintegration process. Is teletransportation survival, or death followed by
the creation of a doppelganger?
Well, suppose we come across an alien species who use teletransporters all
the time as a form of rapid transit, and universally believe that teletransporta-
tion is survival. It would be hubristic (at best) to suppose that we know best
here: presumably (with aliens as with other emergent objects) what justifies the
validity of a given theory of personal identity is its predictive and explanatory
power, and regarding an alien about to step into the teletransporter as the same
as the one who steps out of the arrival booth is far more explanatory of the
aliens’ social and cultural practices.
We don’t have teletransporters on Earth, so practical considerations like this
aren’t currently available. But suppose we did, and suppose we started using
them widely; then our culture would (in that respect!) become like the aliens’,
and just as we did with the aliens, we should regard ourselves as surviving the
teletransportation.
Would we start using them widely? I imagine that we would, but I don’t
know; in any case, it’s a sociological question, and could depend wildly on
extraneous factors. (Suppose, at one extreme, that a cover-up leads everyone to
think that the teletransporters are really wormholes in spacetime that transport
people whilst preserving their physical continuity, and that people use them
quite happily for centuries before the truth is discovered.)
It seems to me that the case of splitting is analogous. There is an extension
of our theory of personal identity according to which we should expect survival
and subjective uncertainty upon walking into a classical splitter, but I have
no idea whether we would adopt it (I should think that it would depend very
sensitively on the circumstances in which the splitters were introduced into our
society).
But if the correct account of what it would be like to undergo ‘classical split-
ting’ rests on considerations like these, then — Lewis’s account notwithstanding
– it becomes unclear that the analogy helps us understand quantum-mechanical
branching. For we should not be asking: how should we extend our concepts if
branching suddenly became possible, but rather: how should we understand our
existing concepts, given that branching has been happening all the time? It isn’t
as if we are asked what to think if we were suddenly transported from a clas-
sical to an Everettian world, or if a switch had been flipped so that Everettian
branching was suddenly occurring.
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For these reasons, I conclude that although I personally find Saunders’
thought-experiment to be a very effective way of seeing why it makes sense
to consider branching as subjectively indeterministic, it fails in its larger goal
of showing that we are required to regard it thus, both because the question of
how to regard classical splitting seems indeterminate and sensitively dependent
on the details of its implementation in our society, and because in any case that
question is not fully analogous to the question of how we should think about
quantum branching.
3.5 Subjective Uncertainty again: arguments from inter-
pretative charity
So: if splitting has been occurring all the time, how should we think about it?
This brings us on to my own preferred solution to the subjective uncertainty
problem (which I present more fully in Wallace (2005)): that the problem is
solved by considering how to interpret the language of inhabitants of a branching
universe.
To elaborate: suppose that we consider a race of beings who inhabit a
branching universe (that is, a universe like that entailed by the Everett inter-
pretation, where one world physically splits into many), but where the beings
don’t realise this. Suppose further that when confronted with what are in fact
branching events, they are disposed to say ‘I am *uncertain what is going to
occur’; (where ‘*uncertain’ is a term in their language). More generally, sup-
pose that they are normally disposed to assert ‘A *will happen’ only when it
happens in every branch futurewards of the assertion, and to deny it only when
it happens in no branch. However, their philosophers, asked to give an analysis
of *uncertainty, are led by their ignorance of branching to the claim that one
should be *uncertain of something only if there is some objective fact of the
matter about which to be *uncertain, and that ‘A *will happen’ is true iff A
happens in the single determinate future.
What are the real meanings of ‘*uncertain’ and ‘*will’? One possibility (call
it the Elite View) is to accept the philosophers’ claims about their meaning,
in which case (given that these beings’ universe really branches) it appears
that almost all the beings are using their language very inaccurately and are
making all manner of claims which are either false or meaningless. For when
the beings say (e. g. ) “The Red party *will not win the election”, on the Elite
view they mean that in the single determinate future, the Red party do not win
the election. But in their branching universe, the ‘single determinate future’ is
one in which the world splits into many copies, in some of which the Red party
win and in some of which they do not. Does this make it true that the Red
party win in the future (because they do in some branches), or ill-posed that
they do (because such claims presuppose falsely that there is no branching)? If
the former, the beings’ claim is false; if the latter, it is meaningless.
The alternative to the Elite View (call it the Charitable View) regards the
beings as using the terms entirely correctly and accepts that the beings’ philoso-
phers are wrong about their language.
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Which view is correct? Given plausible assumptions about the philosophy of
language (notably, a certain externalism and/or holism about meaning) there
can be no completely decisive answer: the beings are seriously wrong about
some aspect of their world-view, but we cannot decide what they are wrong
about prior to deciding their semantics. However, it is highly relevant that the
Elite View makes the beings wrong almost all the time, about almost every-
thing, whereas the Charitable View preserves the truth of most of their dis-
course and falsifies only fairly specialised parts of it (parts, furthermore, which
were motivated by a wildly inaccurate metaphysics). According to the radical-
interpretation approach to semantics espoused by Davidson (1973), Lewis(1974,
1975), Quine (1960) et al, there are no further facts about meaning beyond fit to
usage and the best interpretation is, other things being equal, that which makes
most of the community’s utterances come out true. If we accept any variant of
this approach, then the Charitable View easily seems to beat the Elite View.
Applying these arguments to our own language, it seems that we should
conclude that our use of ‘uncertain’ to describe our attitude to the outcomes of
quantum measurements is entirely justified. We are wrong about some of the
referential underpinnings of uncertainty talk, but no wonder — the metaphysical
considerations (such as the absence of widespread branching) which led us to
assume those referential underpinnings were drastically wrong.9
(It is perhaps worth stressing that this distinction between the Elite and
Charitable views is not just a linguistic dispute. Of course we can define ‘uncer-
tain’ to mean whatever we like; we can define ‘blancmange’ to mean anything
we like, too. But the argument is rather that our existing talk of future possi-
bility and uncertainty, and the entire conceptual framework that goes with it,
already refers to quantum branching, for all that we have not as yet realised
it. As such, we are fully justified in applying our existing machinery for test-
ing and confirming theories to the Everett interpretation, and in particular we
can regard any evidence for the Quantum Algorithm as supporting the Everett
Interpretation. The point will be considered more carefully in section 5.)
This argument for the Charitable View is insufficient to establish the details
of the natives’ (or indeed our) semantics in the case of future-directed utter-
ances, and in fact there are several variants available (the following remarks
are expanded upon in Wallace 2005). For instance, we might apply Lewis’s
approach to branching (discussed above): on this basis (as has already been
discussed) an agent can continue to maintain that he is uncertain of an out-
come iff there is some fact of the matter to be uncertain about — the ‘fact of
the matter’ is which continuant agent he is. (Or possibly: in which continuant
world he is: we might more naturally apply Lewis’s theory of identity to entire
worlds rather than just to agents.) Alternatively, we might regard the logic of
9An analogy: suppose that actually the clear transparent liquid that we drink isn’t H2O
at all, it’s been XYZ all along, but an International Conspiracy of Chemists has hidden this
from the public. Philosophers have produced semantic theories, on the basis of this faulty
information, that water is necessarily H2O. When Woodward and Bernstein uncover the
Conspiracy, how will the Washington Post report it: as ‘water isn’t H2O’ (the Charitable
View) or as ‘the sea doesn’t contain water’ (the Elite View).
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future-directed utterances as non-bivalent (as is often done in conventional tense
logic; cf. Thomason (1970), or we might take such expressions as systematically
ambiguous as to which branches they refer to.
It may in fact be that there is no determinate answer other than utility to the
question of which is correct (one is reminded of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis).
The conclusion is the same regardless: confronted with quantum-mechanical
splitting, I should correctly assert “I am uncertain about A” whenever I know
that A obtains in some but not all branches futurewards of the point of assertion.
3.6 Quantum weights and the functional definition of prob-
ability
I have argued that an agent in a branching universe should be genuinely un-
certain about which outcome of branching will occur. As such, a believer in
the Everett interpretation can now coherently assign credences to each possible
outcome of a quantum measurement, despite his perfect objective knowledge.
Since each possible outcome is assigned a quantum-mechanical weight, we are
now in a position where weight is the sort of thing that could fit the functional
definition of probability given in section 2.1. If we simply add to the Everett
interpretation the postulate that weights in fact fit the functional definition, we
can deduce that the Everett interpretation entails the Quantum Algorithm, and
as such we can regard empirical evidence for that algorithm as supporting the
Everett interpretation.
If this was all that the Everett interpretation could achieve, it should still
be seen as solving the measurement problem: it provides a physically complete,
observer-independent theory in which is embedded the Quantum Algorithm. It
may be a postulate that probability=weight, but the postulate is no worse off
than in any other probabilistic physical theory.10 In particular, we can perfectly
well adopt the cautious functionalism espoused in section 2.3, and hope that in
the future some argument will be found to justify why weight fits the functional
definition.
However, things are actually rather brighter than this. There is no need for
cautious functionalism where the Everett interpretation is concerned. As was
originally argued by Deutsch (1999), and is defended in detail in Wallace (2003b)
and Wallace (2003c), the principles of decision theory actually entail the fact
that weight fits the functional definition. That is: in the Everett interpretation,
we can prove that weight=probability.
I will not attempt to develop these decision-theoretic proofs here, since the
details are somewhat involved and vary from proof to proof, but the underlying
principle is essentially that of symmetry: if there is a physical symmetry be-
tween two possible outcomes there can be no reason to prefer one to another.
Suppose, for instance, that a particle is prepared in an equally-weighted su-
perposition of spin-up and spin-down. Subjective uncertainty tells me that I
10This position has been defended in print by Simon Saunders (1998); see also Papineau
(1996).
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should expect, on measuring it, to observe either spin-up or spin-down: to jus-
tify weight=probability then we need an argument that I should expect each
with equal likelihood, which is to say (given the operational nature of credence)
that I should be indifferent between a bet on spin-up and a bet with the same
stakes on spin-down. The two bets generate quantum states
1√
2
(|spin up; bet won〉+ |spin down; bet lost〉)
and
1√
2
(|spin up; bet lost〉+ |spin down; bet won〉) (5)
That is, in both cases the final state is an equally weighted superposition of
winning and losing the bet; the two states differ only by the correlations between
measurement outcome and payoff, and in a sufficiently idealized setup I will be
indifferent to this.
This does not suffice in itself; one might counter by noting that agents don’t
care about the weight of their own branches any more than they care about
these correlations. The simplest way to respond to this is to note that my
post-measurement successors are indifferent about erasing these correlations,
something that is physically impossible when it comes to the weight of their
branch.
It is perhaps instructive to note that symmetry-based arguments for proba-
bilities have frequently been advanced in non-quantum contexts, but ultimately
fall foul of the problem that the symmetry is broken by one outcome rather
than another actually happening (leading to a requirement for probability to
be introduced explicitly at the level either of the initial conditions or of the
dynamics to select which one happens). They find their natural home — and
succeed! — in Everettian quantum mechanics, where all outcomes occur and
there is no breaking of the symmetry.
I leave it to the reader to examine the more detailed versions of these ar-
guments in the papers cited and decide whether they are valid. If so, then
the Everett interpretation has allowed us to make genuine progress on a funda-
mental problem in the philosophy of probability; even if not, the interpretation
is no worse off than any other physical theory which makes use of objective
probability.
4 Rejecting subjective uncertainty
4.1 The fission program
Notwithstanding the arguments advanced above, subjective uncertainty remains
controversial. It is therefore interesting to ask to what extent we can understand
the Everett interpretation without its use.
Suppose, then, that we reject subjective uncertainty. Then there are indeed
no objective chances, and an agent who knows quantum mechanics (and the
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quantum state) is not in any way uncertain about the outcomes of measure-
ments. Instead, such an agent knows that he has a multitude of successors: so,
faced with branching, his task is to consider the interests of the (indefinitely)
large number of successors which one will have after branching occurs, and to
take that course of action which best serves those interests. This response (im-
plicit in Deutsch (1999) and given explicit and elegant expression in Greaves
(2004)) might be called the fission program.11It is a radical program: it entails
the falsehood of a great deal of our pre-theoretic view of the world.12 (But
then, given the radical nature of the Everett proposal itself, why not expect
such widespread falsehood?)
The fission program can best be understood (Greaves 2004) as offering rein-
terpretations of the mathematical axioms of decision theory so as to apply not
to an agent’s ignorance of his single future but to his preferences between his
multiple successors. For instance, the Dominance axiom states (roughly) that
an agent should regard A as preferable to B whenever A rewards him better
than B irrespective of how the future turns out (for instance, if A and B are
bets where A always gives higher payoff than B, then Dominance says that A
is preferable to B). The radical program reinterprets Dominance as saying that
the agent should regard A as preferable to B if each of his successors is rewarded
more richly under A than under B.
Each of the axioms has such a reinterpretation, and it is plausible that each
reinterpretation is rationally compelling for someone in a branching universe.
As such, the reinterpretation of the decision-theoretic representation theorem
tells us that rational agents choose that action which maximises expected util-
ity, where the weights in the expected-utility calculation are not credences in
unknown outcomes but rather a measure of how much that agent cares about
each of his determinate future descendants. Following Greaves (2004), I shall
call this measure the caring measure.
The advocate of the fission program now proposes the following rational-
ity principle (call it the quantum caring principle, or QCP): rational agents
are compelled to allocate caring measure to branches in proportion to their
quantum-mechanical weight, when they know the latter. That is, if E is a
proposition, T is the Everett interpretation (interpreted according to the fission
program) and X is the proposition that the weight of all branches on which E
is true at the time in question is x (relative to the agent), then QCP requires
11This is Greaves’ terminology, more or less. I was tempted to call it the ‘Parfittian pro-
gram’, but this seems a little impertinent since Parfit himself is not an advocate of it.
12For instance, suppose that we analyse ‘untrustworthy’, crudely, as ‘probably isn’t telling
the truth’. Then, more than likely, no-one is untrustworthy (since nearly everyone is telling
the truth on at least some branches), or perhaps everyone is (since nearly everyone is lying on
at least some branch). A substantial fraction of the rest of our everyday concepts are similarly
undermined.
Of course, the natural move is to change our analysis of ‘untrustworthy’: we now realise
that it means ‘lies on high-weight branches’. But this natural move, taken to its logical
conclusion, leads back to the charity argument for subjective uncertainty, and away from the
fission program.
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that
Cr(E|T&X) = x. (6)
If QCP is true then rational agents will act in an Everettian universe just as
they would have acted in a universe where the Quantum Algorithm was true;
as such, the fission program amounts to a sort of ‘fictionalist’ approach to the
quantum algorithm, in that it entails that rational agents should behave as if
there were objective probabilities even though strictly there are none.
Can we provide any sort of argument for QCP? Actually, we can provide
a very good one: the decision-theoretic proofs of the Born rule mentioned in
section 3.6 apply mutatis mutandis to the fission program under the reinterpre-
tation of the decision-theoretic axioms, and entail that caring measure=weight.
Note, though, that even if these proofs fail then QCP is not obviously worse off
than the Principal Principle. That is: in both cases we appear to have a primi-
tive rationality principle, something which we would very much rather avoid (in
one case: that probability=weight; in the other, that caring measure=weight).
In both cases we do not yet know how to derive that principle rather than just
postulating it; in both cases we are nonetheless prepared to continue using it.
This analogy, however, is suggestive rather than conclusive. I do not see
what rational argument could be given to justify our accepting the Principal
Principle without argument but demanding a justification of QCP; perhaps one
can be found though.
4.2 Against the fission program
Whether or not QCP is problematic, we should be slow to accept the fission
program as I have so far formulated it. Partly, there are general methodological
grounds to be wary of it: denying that ‘uncertainty’ is applicable to branching
requires us to accept (given the ubiquity of branching) that most of our existing
worldview is wildly wrong, in contrast with the general naturalistic viewpoint
(as defended by Quine and Neurath) that progress in science and philosophy
comes from successively modifying our worldview, not from rejecting it almost
in toto.
More concretely, though, the fission program as presented above provides
an answer to the wrong question. Specifically, it tells us: “supposing that we
believed that the Everett interpretation was true, what would constitute rational
action — that is, what rationality principles should we conform to in deciding
how to live our lives?” And indeed it would be crucial to answer that question
if we indeed came to believe in the Everett interpretation.
But this is not currently our situation. Rather, we want to know, ‘should we
believe the Everett interpretation in the first place?’ That is, is the Everett in-
terpretation explanatory of our current epistemic situation? And this, I believe,
is extremely difficult to answer if we eschew all talk of uncertainty.
For recall: in section 3.1 I argued that the task of an interpretation of
quantum mechanics is to embed the Quantum Algorithm that is instrumentalist
QM into a satisfactory physical theory (with the possibility that it is slightly
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modified in the process). The fission program explicitly rejects that task when
it rejects the notion of probability.
What, then, could make us come to accept the fission program? Presum-
ably, that it offers an explanation for observed phenomena just as good as the
Quantum Algorithm (while being an improvement over the Quantum Algorithm
in that it is a coherent, complete scientific theory). But it is not clear why this
should be so. The ‘observed phenomena’ are in essence a vast list of experimental
outcomes whose relative frequencies correspond very closely to the probabilities
defined by QM. The fission program predicts that there are branches in which
this is indeed so, and ascribes a very high weight to such branches, but as yet
it offers no reason why it is rational to assume that we are in one such branch.
All it can provide is a prudential reason to care about successors in proportion
to their weights, but that does not seem to be of epistemic import.
This point can be made more formally within the Bayesian framework for
theory confirmation. Recall: in ordinary decision theory there are plausible
arguments that we should update our credence in a hypothesis via conditional-
ising. That is, if CrA(B) is our credence in some proposition B subsequent to
learning that A, then
CrA(B) = Cr(B|A) ≡ Cr(B&A)/Cr(A). (7)
It then follows from Bayes’ Theorem that for some theory T and some evidence
E
CrE(T ) = CrT (E)Cr(T )/Cr(E). (8)
If E is some a priori unlikely event assigned high objective probability by T ,
then (since by the Principal Principle, Chance(E) = CrT (E)) it follows that our
credence in T will rise upon observing E.
However, according to the fission program we cannot regard the outcomes of
experiments as being assigned high or low objective probability: all outcomes
occur, so CrT (E) = 1 irrespective of the weight of E. This seems to undermine
the idea that it is our observation of high-weight events that provides any evi-
dential support for quantum mechanics, since — notwithstanding QCP — the
weight does not seem to appear in the Bayesian update rule.
Greaves (2004) anticipates this kind of objection, and offers a possible re-
sponse. She argues that on the assumption that we live in a branching, Everettian-
style universe, we can construct an analogue of the Bayesian update rule and
prove its validity. But it is unclear at best how this strategy can help us where
we are concerned with evidence for the Everett interpretation itself. For suppose
that her argument succeeds. Let T be the hypothesis that the Everett interpre-
tation is true and let Xi be the further hypothesis that the weight of branches
in which evidence E occurs is xi. Then Greaves’ analogue of the update rule
combined with the QCP entails that
CrET (Xi) =
xiCrT (Xi)∑
j xjCrT (Xj)
. (9)
21
All that this allows us to do is to update various credences all of which are
conditional on T : that is, on the truth of the Everett interpretation. It pro-
vides no way to make any statements about rational credence in the Everett
interpretation itself.
The conclusion to draw from this is that we cannot assess evidence for a
theory within an epistemic framework which presumes that very theory. This
makes it difficult to assess evidence for Everett according to the fission program:
our normal epistemic framework presumes that we are ignorant about the out-
come of experiments which are to be performed, and this is simply false from
the perspective of the fission program.
I am only aware of one solution to this problem which is compatible with
the fission program, and (perhaps tellingly) it too makes use of the notion of
ignorance. Vaidman (2002) has observed that an agent who has performed a
quantum experiment but does not yet know the outcome is uncertain about
that outcome in a fairly conventional way: that is, the agent knows that the
outcome has some particular value but is ignorant of that value. A rational
agent presumably deals with this uncertainty in the usual way, by ascribing
probabilities: call these the Vaidman probabilities of outcomes.
A defender of the fission program can now proceed in either of two ways.
The first is simply to stipulate that rational agents must set the Vaidman prob-
ability of an event equal to its quantum weight: that is, to stipulate that the
quantum weights fit the functional definition of objective chance as applied to
the Vaidman probabilities. The second is to argue, as above, from decision-
theoretic considerations that the caring measure of an event in my future is
equal to its quantum weight, and then further argue (probably by means of
Dutch-Book-type considerations) that my future selves must set their Vaidman
probabilities to be equal to the caring measures that I now assign to them.
In either case, the Vaidman probabilities enable us to give a conventional
treatment of the epistemology of quantum mechanics. For Vaidman probability
is probability nonetheless13, and an agent who gives high probability to some
measurement result E conditional on quantum mechanics will be justified in
increasing his credence in the latter if he observes the former.
This strategy provides, so far as I can see, the only promising means to
salvage the fission program; however, I do not find it wholly satisfactory, for
two (admittedly very inconclusive) reasons. Firstly, the Vaidman probabilities
are somewhat contrived entities to use as the foundation of our epistemology
of quantum mechanics. It is undeniably the case that we often find ourselves
in Vaidman’s sort of uncertainty; however, in the bulk of experiments which
we perform to test quantum mechanics the gap between our conducting the
experiment and observing the result is too short to allow us time to be uncertain.
(Consider, for instance, observations of a Geiger counter.)
Secondly, it is not at all clear that Vaidman probabilities can be introduced
13It is admittedly a slightly unusual sort of probability: not probability of being in a par-
ticular possible world, but rather probability of being in a particular location in a known
possible world. This sort of self-locating uncertainty does seem to lead to some odd problems:
see Elga (2000) for an example.
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at all without admitting full-blooded subjective uncertainty. For consider: an
agent about to make a measurement should expect, with certainty, that he will
branch into many copies each of whom is subjectively uncertain about what
result he will see when he looks. That is: he should expect, with certainty,
that he will be uncertain about the result of the measurement. Is this any
different from being uncertain right now about that result? I am inclined to
think not, but the argument now begins to merge with the argument from
interpretative charity, and I shall not pursue it further. I should stress, however,
that insofar as the Vaidman probability strategy succeeds, it succeeds because
it reintroduces into the Everett interpretation a notion of uncertainty, to which
we can apply our existing decision and confirmation theories. Whether it is
introduced via subjective uncertainty or via the Vaidman method, uncertainty
of outcome result seems to be an essential component of the epistemology of the
Everett interpretation.
5 Justifying the axioms of decision theory
5.1 The primitive status of the decision-theoretic axioms
At this point a sceptic might ask:
This house of cards that you have constructed makes essential use
at many points of the axioms of decision theory. What right have
you to assume that those axioms hold in a branching Universe? And
don’t respond by reference to subjective uncertainty, please. Who
is to say that the axioms apply to this sort of uncertainty, and not
just to the more conventional sorts that Savage et al no doubt had
in mind?
I think that there is a certain amount of force to this objection, but that
as stated it misses the point. For underlying it is an epistemological story that
goes like this:
At one time, we had a metaphysical framework which included an
analysed notion of uncertainty (analysed in the ‘conventional’14 way
as tenseless ignorance of the state of the entire universe and/or of
our location within it); at this time, though, we had no decision-
theoretic axioms whatsoever. We then considered what behavioural
principles would be rational for beings in our situation, and hence
derived the axioms of decision theory.
But this is wildly wrong. Nothing like this actually underpins our historical
propensity to conform to the decision-theoretic axioms, and in fact our reason
14I use the term reluctantly! If the Everett interpretation is true, then branching-type
uncertainty is as conventional as can be — most of our ordinary uncertainty talk refers at
least in part to it.
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to believe them is not based on any such argument either. Consider, for instance,
why we believe an axiom like the ‘Dominance’ axiom mentioned in section 4.1.
(Recall that it says, roughly, that an agent should regard A as preferable to B
whenever A rewards him better than B irrespective of how the future turns out.
Suppose we consider trying to justify the following special case:
S1 A coin is definitely going to be flipped. You have a choice of accepting
a bet which pays you ten dollars if the coin lands heads, and nothing if
it doesn’t. You are not certain that the coin will not land heads. It is
rational to take the bet.
Or consider trying to justify the following (a special case of what I call constancy,
which is required in some versions of the decision-theoretic proofs of the quantum
probability rule (Wallace 2006b)):
S2 You have to choose whether or not to have a coin flipped. You don’t care
whether the coin lands heads or tails (if it is flipped), and whether or
not it is flipped you’ll receive ten dollars. It is rational not to care about
whether or not the coin is flipped.
I think the response of most people as to why they should accept these
principles would be bemusement: they are, I hope, blindingly obvious. If we
really pressed someone for a defence of the principles, they might, if they had
sufficient patience, come up with something like
S1 The coin will either land heads or tails. It’s at least possible that it will
land heads, in which case if you accepted the bet you’ll be better off. And
if it lands tails, it won’t make any difference. So take the bet! You won’t
do worse, and you might do better.
S2 If you choose to flip the coin, then it will come down either heads or tails. If
it comes down heads, then you won’t care whether it was flipped, because
you don’t care what’s on the coin and you get the money anyway. If it
comes down tails, likewise. So whatever happens, you won’t care about
whether the coin was flipped.
Note two things about these explanations. Firstly, they don’t break out of the
set of interconnected terms like ‘will’, ‘might’, ‘uncertain’, and the like. As
such, if subjective uncertainty is defensible then they are just as applicable to
quantum branching as to any other kind of uncertainty.
Secondly, they aren’t really explanations at all, in the sense that the expla-
nations don’t involve concepts or ideas that are more basic or obvious than those
used in stating the principles themselves. It’s rather like trying to justify the
laws of logic: if I try to justify “if (A and B), then A” by saying: “suppose ‘A
and B’; then in particular, A; therefore, A” I similarly haven’t really explained
anything, just shown some (in this case rather shallow) interconnections between
equally basic concepts.
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5.2 Holistic scepticism
We could conclude from the above that the decision-theoretic axioms should
just be taken as primitively obvious, and left entirely unexplained; but this
would be too quick. By analogy, consider the Soundness Theorem of first-order
logic, which demonstrates that the rules of deduction produce only semantically
valid arguments. No-one who ever doubted this fact would be convinced by
the Soundness Theorem: our confidence in the laws of logic is far stronger than
our confidence that we got the proof right, especially as the proof itself involves
heavy use of the very logical notions which we wish to explain. Nonetheless
the Soundness Theorem, showing as it does the interconnections between se-
mantic and syntactic notions of validity, gives (some) insight into why the rules
of deduction are as they are. Dummett (1978), in making this point, refers
to the theorem as an explanatory argument for the laws of deduction; he con-
trasts it with suasive arguments, the sorts of arguments which can convince the
unconvinced, and claims plausibly that no suasive argument is available here.
Further insight into the relevance of the Soundness Theorem can be gained if
we imagine what we should conclude if — per impossibile — that theorem turned
out to be false (and not false due to some isolated error, but irresolvably false).
We would not, of course, simply shrug our shoulders and stop using deduction!
Rather, our entire intellectual framework would be in ruins. To countenance
the possibility of such a failure would be to countenance a particularly strong
form of scepticism, according to which we are not merely mistaken about many
features of our world, but furthermore that world is set up so as to prevent us
reasoning about it in any justified way. (I will call this ‘holistic scepticism’).
As another, and more naturalistic, example, suppose that we are interested
in explaining the veridical nature of vision. That is, we would like to explain
why are we (usually) justified in assuming that the three-dimensional world
around us is as it appears to our sight. This would (conceptually, at least) be
a reasonably straightforward task provided that we were studying some other
species: a satisfactory theory of how their perceptual apparatus and their brains
function will allow us to determine whether their perceptions match the outside
world totally, partially, or not at all — although in the latter case the holistic
framework by which we ascribe mental states to them may again start to break
down and to give wildly indeterminate results.
Justifying our own visual capacities is more complex. We can use exactly the
same scientific methodology as we might for other species, but with the proviso
that we are assuming at start that our perceptions are normally accurate —
else we could trust neither the readings we “observe” on our apparatus, nor the
results communicated to us by co-workers. Nonetheless it seems that we can
“bootstrap” our way to a satisfactory justification of our perceptual accuracy,
simply because we can ourselves find the scientific explanation that third-party
students of our species are able to find — and which, we have already argued,
constitutes an explanation if anything does.
Furthermore, the requirement that we assume ceteris paribus that our per-
ceptions are accurate does not prevent us from identifying relatively isolated
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flaws in that assumption, again in the same manner that third-party observers
would use. Suppose for instance that everyone on Earth had vivid perceptions
of winged snakes flying out of the Sun at noon. Nothing in the picture thus
far developed prevents scientists from concluding that those perceptions are not
veridical, and indeed from identifying the neural mechanisms which cause such
false perceptions.
What is not possible in this picture is for us to identify in ourselves the really
widespread failure of visual veridicality which we might in principle discover for
another species. Such a “discovery” would so thoroughly undermine our starting
assumptions as to be worthless — but in doing so it would thoroughly undermine
our entire worldview. Vision, as much as deduction, is sufficiently essential
to our epistemological project that it is another form of holistic scepticism to
suppose that we might find that it is flawed in too widespread a way.15
But now suppose the scenario to be modified slightly. Suppose that our
argument for holistic scepticism relied on some auxiliary hypothesis H: some-
thing (let us suppose) intensely plausible, but not so conceptually indispensable
as deduction or sight. Then our conclusion would be clear: H (or some other
such auxiliary hypothesis) must be abandoned, however plausible it may have
seen.
5.3 The role of an explanation of decision theory
Returning to decision theory, we can now see what significance might be played
by an explanation of the decision-theoretic axioms. Such an explanation will
have little or nothing to do with our reasons to believe decision theory, but it will
give some insight into why decision theory is nonetheless correct. Furthermore,
if such an explanation leads to holistic scepticism on the assumption that the
world is branching, then we must abandon that assumption.
In more detail: let us suppose for a moment that the arguments of section 3
persuade us to adopt the Everett interpretation, but that we then decide that our
‘rational’ behaviour is completely unjustified in an Everettian universe, and that
the rational thing to do would be to curl up into a ball. Then the entire argument
sequence — from our existing rationality, through the Everett interpretation,
to the wholesale rejection of our existing rationality — would be a reductio ad
absurdum, in effect, of whatever got us started on that sequence in the first
place.
15What about ‘virtual reality’ scenarios such as those described in films like The Matrix
(and more soberly in some variants of the brain-in-a-vat thought-experiment)? These seem
comprehensible (indeed, theoretically possible) despite the apparent widespread failure of
sensory reliability which they imply. I am myself persuaded by the analysis of Chalmers
(2003) (itself rather reminiscent of Putnam’s (1981) treatment of the brain in the vat): no
‘failure of sensory reliability’ actually occurs. Rather, the various objects represented to us in
a sufficiently all-encompassing virtual reality should genuinely be taken to exist. Our error is
not in believing them to exist, but in believing them not to be computer-generated entities
instantiated in some underlying hardware. (There is actually something of an analogy to the
charity argument presented in section 3.5.) Further discussion, though, would take us too far
afield.
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This last does not in any way suggest that the branching hypothesis is more
vulnerable to such a possible criticism than the non-branching hypothesis. If we
were in fact to find that it is the non-branching assumption which undermines
decision theory, then branching would be forced upon us. I have not the slightest
wish to argue for such a radical and implausible conclusion; nonetheless, the
non-branching case (being more familiar) provides a good starting point in any
investigation of how to explain the decision-theoretic axioms. Recall that, in
the non-branching picture,
1. ‘Ignorance’ is ignorance of the (tenseless) truth of certain facts about the
(tenseless) state of the Universe. An agent, in being ignorant of some
future event, simply lacks a certain item of objectively-describable knowl-
edge.16
2. An agent (regarded as a person-stage) cares about future versions of him-
self (that is, future person-stages with the appropriate structural and
causal relations to him.)
A set of defences of S1–2 might then be:
S1 There’s something the agent doesn’t know, and which he is choosing to bet
on. On bet 1, his future descendant does better than on bet 2 irrespective
of how that something turns out. So he isn’t ignorant of which bet will be
better for his descendant, even though he is ignorant about the outcome
of the bet.
S2 The agent can make one of two bets, and whichever bet he makes his future
descendant receives a a certain fixed reward. According to the bet he
chooses, that descendant’s environment has certain properties about which
he is ignorant, but to which he is indifferent. Therefore, the agent himself
should be indifferent as to those properties; therefore, he should not care
which bet he takes.
I hope that it is clear that no-one comes to believe S1 or S2 on the basis of
arguments such as these! They are explanatory only in the sense that they help
us come to a better understanding of why the principles are true, not in the
sense that they would convince someone who did not already accept them that
they should reconsider.
Can we construct analogous arguments in the case of branching? It is here,
I think, that “Parfittian” arguments about caring for our successors, such as
those involved in the ‘fission program’, come into place. Recall, for instance, the
fission-program reinterpretation of Dominance: an agent is justified in preferring
action A over action B iff all his successors do better under A than under B.
If this is regarded not as a reinterpretation of the Dominance axiom but as an
explanation of it, it is (I claim) every bit as reasonable an explanation as the
analogous non-branching explanation of Dominance.
16Actually, this simplified picture fails to take into account the need for indexical knowledge.
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Arguments such as these aim to establish, in effect, that even if we knew that
future-directed uncertainty was really branching, we should rationally continue
to behave exactly as we did before we knew this. Our existing attitude to
decision-making in the face of branching just is to treat it as uncertainty, because
that’s what words like ‘uncertainty’ actually refer to if the Everett interpretation
is true. But the arguments of the fission program show us why the decision-
theoretic axioms are justified on the assumption that it is true.
This is not to deny that some isolated aspects of our view of rationality might
need revision if we accept the Everett interpretation (rather as the ‘winged
snakes’ of the vision example above would imply a localised revision of our
assumption that vision is reliable). One possible example — long discussed
informally among physicists and recently analysed by Lewis (2004), Lewis (2000)
and Papineau (2003) — is quantum Russian roulette: bet a large sum on an
unlikely quantum event, and arrange to be instantly obliterated if you lose. It
has been argued that if the Everett interpretation is correct then it is rational
to expect survival with certainty in these experiments, and thus to agree to
partake in them. (I’m sceptical myself, but will not defend that scepticism
here.) As always, we sail in Neurath’s boat, and no part of our conceptual
scheme is completely insulated from criticism and revision. But it is to deny
that such revisions could be so widespread as to undermine our original reasons
for coming to accept the Everett interpretation.
We seem to find that the epistemology of the Everett interpretation has a
two-part structure. First we must ask: is the interpretation explanatory of our
current epistemic situation, on the assumption that our existing approaches to
decision-making and uncertainty are basically rational? If the answer is yes, we
must also ask (on pain of holistic scepticism) whether that assumption remains
valid if the Everett interpretation is indeed true. I claim that we are now in a
position to give affirmative answers to both questions.
6 Conclusions
Probability enters our scientific theories through the Principal Principle and
only through the Principal Principle. As such, our term ‘objective probabil-
ity’, if it picks out anything, picks out that physical property which satisfies
the functional definition given implicitly by the Principle. Since regarding that
functional definition as true by postulate (i. e. , primitivism) is deeply unattrac-
tive, the best attitude to probability is a cautious functionalism whereby we
assume that something can be proved to satisfy the definition even though we
do not currently have any good candidates.
A solution of the measurement problem is an embedding of the ‘quantum
algorithm’ — that is, the algorithm by which we calculate the objective proba-
bilities of outcomes to experiments — within a complete, physically satisfactory
theory. The Everett interpretation is such a solution17 provided that the prob-
lem of ‘subjective uncertainty’ can be solved: that is, provided that a way can
17On the assumption that decoherence solves the preferred basis problem.
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be found to justify an agent who believes the Everett interpretation nonetheless
being uncertain about the outcomes of a measurement. However, solutions to
this problem are available via interpretative charity and Lewisian treatments of
identity (and possibly also via post-measurement ignorance, i. e. Vaidman prob-
ability).
If a solution to the subjective uncertainty problem can indeed be found, then
the “weights” of branches are candidates for probability in the sense that they
are the right sorts of properties to fit into the functional definition of probability
offered by the Principal Principle. If this were all that could be said, the Everett
interpretation would be no worse off than any other physical theory involving
probability, since no such theory has any argument for why its ‘probability’ fits
the functional definition.
However, it is not all that can be said. Rather, the axioms of decision
theory combined with the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics suffice
to derive the Principal Principle with weights playing the roles of probability;
that is, according to the functional definition of probability, we can prove that
weights are probabilities.
An alternative approach to the Everett interpretation (which I have called
the ‘fission program’) makes no use of subjective uncertainty, but instead rein-
terprets the axioms of decision theory as axioms about how an agent should care
about his successors in the case of branching. This program must be rejected in
its full-strength form, as it does not provide an epistemically acceptable account
of how we can come to accept the Everett interpretation. It does, however, have
an important role to play in the epistemology of the Everett interpretation: af-
ter we have tentatively come to believe the interpretation, the fission-program
reinterpretations of the axioms serve as ‘explanatory arguments’ for the validity
of those axioms, forestalling worries that the Everett interpretation must be
rejected because it undermines our overall conceptual scheme too drastically.
A summary of the epistemic route to the Everett interpretation — and, per-
haps, of the route to any substantial revision of our conceptual scheme — might
be: first see whether your existing machinery for theory appraisal recommends
that you adopt the new theory. If it does, see whether that ‘existing machinery’
is still essentially valid after adopting the new theory’s viewpoint. If the first
step fails, the theory is straightforwardly to be rejected; if the second fails, the
reasons for rejecting the theory are more subtle but no less pressing. Happily,
it appears that neither fails in the case of the Everett interpretation: it solves
the measurement problem in a fully satisfactory way.
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